very heterogeneous in their employment behaviour. ͑2͒ Job creation and destruction are large compared to net changes in employment. This suggests that frictional unemployment might be a more important phenomenon than we used to believe. ͑3͒ We find a negative correlation between job reallocation, i.e. the sum of job creation and job destruction, and net employment growth. This has also been found for many other countries. ͑4͒ Both job creation and job destruction are higher in small firms compared to large ones. Net employment change does not differ very much for the different size classes. ͑5͒ Persistence of created and destroyed jobs varies over the business cycle and varies with firm size. ͑6͒ We find that in large firms job reallocation is more counter-cyclical than in small firms. ͑7͒ The major source of reallocation stems for employment shifts between firms within the same sector, rather than between firms of different sectors.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and defines our measures of the various job flows. Section 3 analyses various aspects of job creation and job destruction. In section 4, we present evidence on the persistence of created and destroyed jobs. Section 5 deals with cross-industrial variation and addresses the question whether aggregate job reallocation mainly reflects within sector or between sector changes in employment opportunities. In section 6 we consider differences in employment behaviour of firms in different size classes. Finally, section 7 concludes.
DATA AND DEFINITIONS
Our data consist of a sample of firm-level observations over the period 1978-1993, provided by The Netherlands' Central Bureau of Statistics ͑CBS͒. The database contains information of firms with respect to the number of employees and a number of other issues. It is based on firms having more than 20 employees on September 30 of each year, all of whom are working 15 hours or more. Firms which temporarily fall below this level are also taken into account. So only a part of the firms with 10 to 20 employees is taken into account. This database gives a complete coverage of all manufacturing firms that fulfil those criteria. The very small businesses, with less than 10 employees are not taken into account. These are typically the ones in which high job turnover takes place, therefore our job reallocation measure underestimates the true value. There is substantial attrition in these statistics because of mergers, firms dropping below the employment threshold, changes in legal status or location, management buy-outs, etc. Considering continuing firms only leads to a reduction of some 60 per cent in the number of firms that are included in the statistics in all 16 years. It is, however, not wise to restrict the analysis to continuing firms only because this will lead to a selectivity bias ͑the continuing firms are also likely to be the more successful firms͒. Therefore we perform our analysis on both continuing firms and on all firms.
As exits in period t, we consider firms which are observed for the last time in period t Ϫ 1 and as entries in period t we consider those firms which show up for the first time in period t. In this way, we avoid some of the bias that is caused by firms which temporarily fall below the employment threshold. We do however have to make an adjustment at the tails because we ignore the firms which temporarily fall below the employment threshold after 1993.
1 To get an idea of the importance of entry and exit it is useful to look at some results found for other European countries. Studies by the OECD ͑1987, 1994͒ reveal that some 70 per cent of entry of firms in France consists of newly created business starting from scratch. For Germany, this figure is reported to be between 80 and 90 per cent. The rest consists of take-overs or created subsidiaries of existing firms and the like. Total job creation and destruction due to entry and exit of establishments ranged between 1 and 2 per cent of employment over the period [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] for Germany, Norway and Canada. In France, Denmark, Finland, Italy, and Sweden, these rates were between 2 and 6 per cent. Using the information of the two OECD studies, it is likely that about three quarters of our entry and exit figures concern the actual birth of new firms from scratch and the actual closure of firms. Another reason to believe that the amount of spurious entries and exits in our study is relatively small is the fact that our figures are of a similar magnitude as entry and exit found by Kleijweg and Lever ͑1995͒ for the Dutch manufacturing sector, using a different data set.
There are reasons to believe that the manufacturing sector is representative for the whole economy. Anderson and Meyer ͑1994͒ show that the job creation in the manufacturing sector of the USA is slightly lower than job creation in the whole of the economy. Blanchflower and Burgess ͑1994͒ report the same for the UK. Evidence for The Netherlands, by Van der Hoeven and Verhoeven͑1994͒, suggests that about 15 per cent of total job creation in 1992 took place in the manufacturing sector. In that year this sector accounted for about 19% of total employment. Hence, job flows in the manufacturing sector are somewhat lower than in the rest of the economy, nevertheless this sector seems to be a reasonable representation of the whole economy. 2 1 We do this by using detailed entry and exit information, which is available for 1987-1993. In Abbring and Gautier ͑1996͒ it is described how this information is linked to the panel. The correction procedure is the following. First we took the difference between 'true' exits ͑bankruptcies and voluntary closings͒ and 'true' entries ͑the start of a brand new firm͒. Call this difference d. Since the entry rate for 1993 in our series is consistent with the other years we just added d to this rate to obtain our corrected exit rate. Another correction method we experimented with, which is based on averages of spurious exits of the proceeding years, led to almost the same figure. We also checked what the time span was of the firms which temporarily disappeared in order to see if we had to adjust more years. It turned out that in 95% of the cases this time span was only one year, so we did not need to adjust the exit rates of 1992 and before. 2 Only in 1993 did employment in the manufacturing sector decrease much more than in the rest of the economy.
We define our measures of job flows according to the standard, as set out in Davis and Haltiwanger ͑1990͒. When emp e, t is the number of employees in firm e at time t, then the size of the firm is defined as: 
͑5͒
The sum of JC and JD is a measure of job reallocation between t Ϫ 1 and t, so:
The net change in employment, which is a common statistic to analyze when the employment performance of a sector or a country is at stake, equals the difference in job creation and job destruction, or:
Before we continue, it is important to note that we define a job to be an employment position in a firm. In this way we avoid difficult issues like whether a secretary who changes her typewriter for a computer changes her job or not. Hamermesh et al. ͑1994͒ propose a measure of job creation and job destruction based on actual employment flows into, out of and within the firm, instead of the net employment changes as in ͑3͒ and ͑5͒. However, they find the within-firm flows to be small. 1979-1993. and net employment growth for continuing firms in the manufactoring sector in The Netherlands over the period 1979-1993. It is evident that there is simultaneous job creation and job destruction, even in the recession period of the early 1980s. As we would expect, the pattern of JC and JD moves in opposite ways. Figure 2 plots rates of job creation, job destruction, reallocation and net employment change of both continuing firms and entry and exit. Surprisingly we see firm entry increasing in the recession of 1983. One reason might be that, in that period, the easiest way for an unemployed worker to enter employment was by starting a new firm. This figure also shows that total job destruction behaves more volatile than total job creation. Hence, net employment change, as well as total job reallocation, is mainly driven by job destruction. This finding is consistent with a number of other studies on job flows, like Davis and Haltiwanger ͑1992͒ and Blanchflower and Burgess ͑1994͒. Job reallocation appears to have been particularly high in the economic downturn of the early 1980s and 1990s. Table 1 presents characteristics of the main variables introduced in the previous section, again decomposed into continuing firms and all firms, including entry and exit. Manufacturing employment dropped with 1 per cent in firms that contunuously operated during the entire sample period, but the underlying gross job flows were considerably larger. JD is more volatile than JC and dominates both the magnitude and cyclical behaviour of JR. When we consider all firms, 1979-1993. i.e., including entry and exit, the variance in JD dominates the variance in JC even more. Again, we find a significant negative correlation between JR and NET.
In the next section we will discuss possible reasons for this pattern. Gross job flows, including entry and exit of firms, are about six times larger than the net employment change. The OECD ͑1987͒ introduced a measure of the 'normal' and 'structural' level of job reallocation. This measure is defined as the sum of the rate of job creation in a recession and the rate of job destruction in a boom. So it represents the amount of job turnover occurring in an economy, regardless of the economic conditions. We find a 'structural' amount of job turnover equal to 10 per cent. Hence, some 70 per cent of job reallocation appears to be of a structural nature.
A useful for heterogeneity of firms in the manufacturing sector is given by the variable EXC, which is defined by taking job reallocation, JR, in excess of the absolute value of the net employment change:
The absolute value of net employment change can be interpreted as the minimally required amount of job reallocation. If all firms would be homogeneous JR would equal NET. Hence, EXC shows the importance of simultaneous job creation and destruction within a certain sector, in other words: the heterogeneity within a sector. A non-zero value of EXC implies that firms are not homogeneous. For continuing firms, we find a value of EXC of 5.8 per cent, while if we also include entries and exits EXC equals 13.4 per cent. This relatively high value shows that there is tremendous heterogeneity among firms in the manufacturing sector. To non-economists, who are not familiar with the 'representative agent and firm' jargon, this heterogeneity among firms may seen obvious. However, most standard economic theories still depart from this premise. This implies that the development of ͑theoretical͒ models that explicitly deal with employment and product heterogeneity should be placed high on the research agenda. Possible explanations may stem from the Bayesian learning theory, developed by Jovanovic ͑1982͒, or the monopolistic competition literature, see Starz ͑1989͒. Also from an industrial organization point of view, heterogeneity of firms is a familiar phenomenon. See e.g., Sinclair-Desgagne and Röller ͑1995͒ and Geroski and Gregg ͑1995͒ and the references therein. Caballero ͑1992͒ also warns against the dangers of ignoring the heterogeneity of firms when going from the representative agent or firm to the aggregate level.
Finally, we want to obtain a meaningful comparison of job reallocation with the reallocation of workers. Clearly, job reallocation implies worker reallocation, but the other way around does not necessarily have to be the case since different workers can allocate themselves over a given set of jobs. We only have information on worker flows in The Netherlands at the aggregate level. However, if we assume that the manufacturing sector is a fair representation of the whole economy, we can say something about it, using the worker flow series from Broersma and Den Butter ͑1995͒. Over the period 1979-1991, they find that on average 10.6 per cent of the workers has moved from one job to another, 5.5 per cent of the workers has moved into unemployment and 2.4 per cent has moved out of labour force. The inflow into employment of new workers from unemployment or non-participation is some 8.8 per cent of employment. Hence, total worker reallocation is 27.3 per cent of employment over the sample. From this it follows that the ratio of total job reallocation to total worker reallocation equals 53%. This is the percentage of total worker reallocation causes by shifts in the distribution of employment opportunities across firms. To avoid double counting of the workers who move from a destroyed to a newly created job we use X s, t MAX s, t as a lower bound on worker reallocation caused by job reallocation, where
͑9͒
In that case we find a ratio of 30 per cent. Hence, between 30 to 53 per cent of worker reallocation is instigated by job reallocation. This is in line with Davis and Haltiwanger ͑1992͒ and Albaek and Sørensen ͑1995͒. In other words, a major fraction of worker reallocation stems from reallocation of jobs.
Why Does Job Reallocation Move Counter-cyclically?
In the recent theoretical literature we can find a number of, not mutually exclusive, explanations for the counter-cyclicality of job reallocation. One line of rea-soning concentrates on opportunity costs, e.g. Davis and Haltiwanger ͑1990͒ and Saint-Paul ͑1993͒. The main message is that reallocation of labour takes time and effort, which cannot be used for normal production. Firms will reallocate in downturns because the opportunity costs, in the form of foregone production, are lowest at that particular moment.
Other explanations make use of search and hiring and firing costs, as Nickell ͑1992͒ and Mortensen and Pissarides ͑1994͒. They argue that job destruction is concentrated in downturns and job creation tends to take place all over the cycle because fast job creation is more costly than fast job destruction. In booms labour markets are tight, which makes it more difficult to fill up newly created vacancies. This last effect is assumed to be stronger than the equally plausible effect that in downturns job destruction is more expensive, because the flow of voluntary quits is lower.
Caballero and Hammour ͑1991, 1994͒ also focus on search costs but besides that they emphasize the importance of sunk instalment costs in the process of job creation. The argument goes as follows. If the wage is the result of a bargaining over the match-surplus between worker and firm, then the instalment costs cannot be subtracted from this surplus as far as they are sunk. We know that in booms, the costs for an individual worker to quit his job and search for a better one are relatively low, but at the same time ͑and because of this͒, the costs of creating a new job will be high for the firm because if the match is only expected to last for a short period, the firm will loose the sunk creation costs.
Then there is the so-called 'lame duck'-effect, introduced by Blanchard and Diamond ͑1990͒. Their idea is that in bad times the fear of bankruptcy and closure is much more real than during good times. In order to avoid going bankrupt, firms restructure in an economic downturn. In all the theories described above, the causality goes from business cycle to job reallocation. Gautier ͑1994͒ shows that the causality can also be the other way around. In periods of structural change when both job creation and job destruction are high, congestion increases and the queues for each vacancy will become longer. As a result, unemployment will also rise.
An International Comparison
In Table 2 a comparison between gross job flows in a number of industrialized countries is presented. if job flows of continuing firms and entry and exit are taken together, we find that our figures for job creation are in line with OECD studies for a number of countries, notably Germany, Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Belgium in the early 1980s ͑before the major reforms in the Swedish economic system͒. For Denmark and the USA, higher rates of job reallocation are found. If high rates of job creation and job destruction are an indication of the ease with which jobs are being created and destroyed and if we believe that the flexibility of the labour market is linked to this ability to create and destroy jobs, then a high job reallocation rate implies a highly flexible labour market. Table 2 then suggests that the labour market in the US is more flexible than in Europe. The high level of reallocation for Denmark is explained by the unique data set of Albaek and Sørensen ͑1995͒, which includes all firms in Danish manufacturing, including the very small ones. Typically in the small firms, with less than 5 or 10 employees, job flow rates are much higher than in larger firms. In all other studies there is some threshold employment level below which firms are not taken into account.
PERSISTENCE
This section addresses the question whether the rates of job creation and destruction reflect transitory or permanent changes in firm-level employment. In other words, do job creation and destruction represent short-lived employment changes which can be implemented by means of temporary hirings, or do these changes suggest more permanent shifts in labour demand? The persistence of created and destroyed jobs is determined as follows. Newly created jobs at firm e in period t equal emp e, t Ϫ emp e, tϪ1 . If emp e, tϩ1 Ն emp e, t , then all of these newly created jobs still exist in t ϩ 1. If emp e, tϩ1 Յ emp e, tϪ1 none of these created jobs are present in t ϩ 1. Next, if emp e, tϩ1 ʦ ͓emp e, tϪ1 , emp e, t ͔, then emp e, tϩ1 Ϫ emp e, tϪ1 of the newly created job are still present in t ϩ 1. Carrying out this exercise for all growing firms in t and dividing the result by JC yields the persistence of created jobs, PJC. The persistence of destroyed jobs, PJD, is calculated analogously; cf. Davis and Haltiwanger ͑1992͒. Table 3 presents the persistence levels of created and destroyed jobs in The Netherlands. These levels are somewhat higher than those found for the USA by Davis and Haltiwanger ͑1992͒ and for the UK by Konings ͑1995͒. Over the whole sample, more than 76 per cent of the jobs created in year t still existed in year t ϩ 1, while 84 per cent of the jobs destroyed in uear t remained destroyed in t ϩ 1.
Our persistent rates change over the cycle, as is shown in Table 3 . Jobs created in a period of economic downturn, like 1980-1983 and 1991-1993 , have less chance to survive the first year than jobs created in an economic upsurge, like [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . The opposite is true for the persistence of job destruction. Table 4 presents the average annual net and gross job flows, as introduced in section 2, for each two-digit industry in the manufactoring sector ͑i.e., SBI 2 and 3͒. Employment contracted in almost every industry, with the rubber and plastics industry and the instruments industry as notable exceptions. The largest fall in employment took place in the clothing industry, while the textile and leather industry also showed a substantial contraction. Evidently, competition in these low productivity sectors has been quite large, especially from low-wage countries. The 1980-1983 1984-1990 1991-1993 1980-1993 1974-1985 1974-1985 Persistence Netherlands are more competitive in the high-tech process industry, like chemicals, rubber and the like, and indeed in those sectors employment was relatively stable. Despite the overall net decline of employment, there still is substantial job creation, even in the sectors with a large drop in employment. In the contracted clothing sector for example, job creation still amounted to 6.15 per cent. Job creation is particularly low in the basic metals industry, while it is relatively high in the food, lumber and wood industries and in the fabricated metal industry. The highest rate of job destruction is also found in the clothing sector, reaching 15 per cent. Job destruction is lowest in electric machinery and in basic metals.
CROSS-INDUSTRY VARIATION
All this implies that there is considerable cross-industry variation in job reallocation. The correlation between reallocation and net employment change for the various SBI subclasses is in almost cases negative, the only exception is the instruments and food and beverages industry. This suggests that also at the industry level job reallocation moves counter-cyclical.
We are also interested in the magnitude and source of job reallocation in firms of different SBI sybclasses. In order to investigate this we use the methodology of Dunne et al. ͑1989͒. We can consider the lower bound on reallocation to be the absolute net change of employment. Job reallocation that exceeds this lower bound arises from shifts of employment across different firms. This excess job reallocation can be disaggregated into two components: employment shifts among firms with similar characteristics ͑two-digit SBI͒ and employment shifts across groups of firms with different characteristics. All of this is captures in the following identity 3 :
where summation is over sector s, in our case the two-digit SBI class. The first term arises from expansion or contraction of the manufacturing sector as a whole.
The second term represents shifts in employment across sectors s minus reallocation resulting from the net change in employment of the manufacturing sector. The final term is the reallocation within a sector, which is composed of reallocation in excess of net employment change in that sector. Table 5 summarizes the magnitude of job reallocation of these three components as a percentage of total reallocation, where the components are based on the two-digit SBI code. Job turnover resulting from the net change in manufacturing is only 2 per cent for continuous firms. The reallocation across industries on average accounts for almost 37 per cent of total reallocation and the withinsector reallocation is by far the largest component, averaging more than 61 per cent, and when we include entry and exit, it is almost 85%. Similar results are found for the USA by Dunne et al. ͑1989͒.
Davis and Haltiwanger ͑1990͒ have made a variance decomposition of job reallocation into aggregate, sectoral and idiosyncratic shocks. They found that most of the job reallocation is driven by idiosyncratic shocks. Abbring and Gautier ͑1996͒ find the same result for The Netherlands while Gautier and Broersma 3 This equation is in persons not in rates. ͑1995͒ show that aggregate shocks are more important than sectoral shocks in The Netherlands. These results provide evidence against Lilien ͑1982͒, who claimed that sectoral shocks are the driving force behind fluctuations in unemployment. According to the sectoral shift theory, sector-specific technology shocks generate large flows of jobs from less productive to productive sectors. When the production factor labour cannot adjust immediately, this results in unemployment.
6 FIRM SIZE Finally, we disaggregate the data to analyze job creation ans job destruction by firms of specific sizes. We distinguish two categories determined by the number of employees: small firms with less than 100 employees and the medium-sized and large firms with more than 100 employees. Table 6 presents the averages of the net and gross job flows by firm size. From this table we can also observe that firms are very heterogeneous. Job reallocation rates decline sharply with average firm size. Small firms have the highest rates of job creation, but also of job destruction. Total job reallocation reaches some 23 per cent of employment for these firms, while for the second size class, it is less than half this value. The large difference between the two categories can be attributed to differences in entry and exit in firms. Entry of firms mainly takes place in the size class of small firms. But exit from this class is also higher than for firms with more than 100 employees. When both continuing firms and entry and exit are taken into account, we find that small firms reallocate less counter-cyclically than large firms. Also note that contraction among continuing firms in the manufacturing sector mainly took place in the larger firms, with more than 100 employees.
Note that it has been argued that this somewhat higher net rate of small firms in mainly caused by regression-to-the-mean bias. The idea is that 'temporary unlucky' firms, which are relatively overrepresented in the class of small firms, will gain jobs on the way to their equilibrium level, whereas firms which have had temporary good luck loose jobs. Another reason could be that in a period of struc- tural change, there is often a shift from old to new industries and because of that, many firms will cross size borders. Finally it could be the case that in large firms there is much more simultaneous hiring and firing which we cannot filter out with our data. Recently, Davis et al. ͑1993͒ have developed methods to avoid this regression fallacy. They found that in definitions of job creation and job destruction, like ͑3͒ and ͑5͒, where the denominator is the average employment, X s, t , as in ͑4͒, is less sensitive to this pitfall than the usual definitions, where the denominator is the employment of the previous year ͑⌺emp e, tϪ1 ͒. Particularly the older studies of job flows in relation to firm size use this latter definition, like Birch ͑1981͒. Nevertheless, even with our more robust definitions, we have found that small firms have higher rates of job creation and destruction and that they contribute more to the growth rate of employment than large firms. See also Klette and Mathiassen ͑1966͒, who find similar results for Norway.
Apart from statistical pitfalls, as the regression-to-the-mean bias, there may also be a number of economic explanations for the difference in rates of job creation and destruction between firms of different size. First, entry of new firms consists mainly small firms. The small firms, whether entering or continuing, have better opportunities to adjust more quickly to changes in economic circumstances than large firms. On the other hand, small new firms also have high exit rates; cf. Broersma and Gautier ͑1995͒. This may have to do with several difficulties which small, new firms encounter. Mismanagement seems one of the major reasons for new firms to go bankrupt, as Van der Hoeven and Verhoeven ͑1994͒ found for The Netherlands. Another reason may be that small firms are faced with more financial constraints compared to large firms, as pointed out by Gertler and Gilchrist ͑1994͒.
The persistence of created and destroyed jobs is reported in Table 7 , where we again distinguish between persistence over the whole sample period and persistence of jobs created and destroyed in an economic downturn, 1980-1983, 1990-1993 and in a boom period, 1984-1990 . It is clear that the persistence of JC is much higher in booms than in recessions while for JD the opposite holds. Over 
PJC PJD
Firm size 1980-1983 1984-1990 1991-1993 1980-1993 1980-1983 1984-1990 1991-1993 1980-1993 the whole sample, we find that the persistence of JD in particular rises with form size.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have studied job creation and job destruction of the manufacturing sector in The Netherlands over the period 1979-1993, based om employment observations at the firm level. We found that there is large heterogeneity of firms in their employment behaviour. This implies that the theoretical concept of the representative firm may have to be abandoned and replaced by theories that can take account of employment heterogeneity. Our finding that job reallocation moves counter-cyclically, especially when entry and exit of firms are included, is in line with observations in a number of other countries. We also found that there are differences in the behaviour of small firms, with less than 100 employees and medium-sized and large firms, with more than 100 employees. Finally, we stress the point that the main source of reallocation comes from firms within the same sector. Hence, idiosyncratic shocks of individual firms may be more important for explaining employment shifts, and thus unemployment, than sectoral or aggregate shocks. Two important topics for further research that result from this study are the relation between newly created jobs and productivity and the transition and propagation of idiosyncratic shocks into large fluctuations at the aggregate level.
